The Aftermath

Dear readers, friends and family, this is the final installment (part 5 of 5) of David Bickford's "A Bloody Summer". Today we revisit the consequences and post-crisis environment in the life of Canadian diplomats and their families. Enjoy the read:




The last official act of the Group of Guarantors was a press conference the day after the release of the hostages. The Guarantors lamented the fact that a peaceful solution had not been reached. They expressed satisfaction that the vast majority of the hostages had survived, but regretted the loss of life, both the hostage killed, the military officers slain, and the 14 MRTA members. As Cipriani expressed it: “Throughout the hostage crisis, I felt like the father of a great family of 86: the 72 hostages and 14 members of the MRTA…My tears are those of a father of a family of 86 persons, of which 17 have been killed in one blow.” Privately, Cipriani later told me how sorry he was that he couldn’t have saved the lives of the teenaged terrorists. It took us all quite some time for the shock of the assault to wear off and to realize that the Group of Guarantors was no more. It was hard to believe that now it really was over.

The heavily secured Canadian Embassy in Lima, Peru

The question of whether the death of all the 14 terrorists was justified continued to be controversial mainly outside Peru. Some suggested that a number of terrorists had raised their hands in surrender, but been shot down, that others had been in hiding after the hostages were freed but were shot when discovered, and several had pleaded for mercy, but to no avail. Several Western European counter-terrorism officers had told me earlier that in such operations, the first priority is to secure the safety of the hostages. Should someone attempt to surrender, you shoot and move on. If you stop to secure a prisoner, you have been diverted from your main task. Also that person may well be faking, and fire at you when you let your guard down. That appears to be the line taken by the Peruvian special forces assault group. Their own losses of two killed and ten badly wounded suggest that the battle was not completely one-sided.

After the rescue operation, the media suggested that Ambassador Vincent, since he was the last member of the Group of Guarantors to enter the Japanese residence – and only two hours before the assault – must have passed the word that the attack would take place that day. Nothing could be further from the truth. We were given no indication by the government that such an attack was to take place. Later Fujimori told the press that the attack would have proceeded as planned even if one of the Guarantors had been inside at the time – truthful but not very diplomatic. Tony was extremely lucky he hadn’t stayed longer, or arrived a bit later.

Nonetheless, the MRTA leadership blamed the Group of Guarantors for the failure of this operation. Apparently, a key part of their strategy had been to execute a hostage every few weeks should talks not proceed, in order to impress upon the Peruvian government the seriousness of their intent and demands. The presence of the Guarantors, particularly Cipriani, made the terrorists in the Japanese residence reluctant to carry this out, and their leaders blamed the Guarantors for interfering. As a result, the Canadian Embassy and its staff remained under a terrorist threat (kidnapping of a senior staff member or a car bomb at the Embassy) for several years after the hostage crisis, until the remnants of the MRTA were either hunted down and killed or imprisoned. My family and I travelled with Peruvian police bodyguards for the next two years, our home had 24 hour armed guards who enjoyed playing basketball with my two sons at shift change time, and the Embassy resembled a bunker with a private guard service within the perimeter of the property, barricades, cement barriers, and high grills/walls with barbed wires surrounding the grounds, and armed SWAT team from the national police (including a bomb squad truck) in the street in front of the building. Not a very welcoming impression for visitors.

Brian, Madeleine, William and David Bickford

Most Peruvians were elated by the result of the rescue operation, and gave the group of Guarantors at least some of the credit – Fujimori never did. For the rest of his time in Peru, Tony was often approached in public places by Peruvians who were anxious to shake his hand and to thank him for his efforts. A year or so later, Francisco Tudela, who had been Peruvian Foreign Minister at the time of the hostage crisis and considered by the MRTA as their prime hostage, told me that, undoubtedly, the Group of Guarantors had saved many lives, including his own. From that point of view, I think we done good, and that it was a good time to be a Canadian in Peru, eh!

What is a Guarantor?

Dear friends, I am happy to share with you the second installment of "A Bloody Summer" (Part 2 of 5) brought to you by David Bickford. Enjoy the read:

The Embassy continued to monitor the hostage crisis, which took up an enormous amount of Peruvian political attention and energy, but there was no evidence that negotiations had even begun. Then, in early January, Ambassador Vincent was asked to serve in a personal capacity as one of a Group of Guarantors. With Ottawa’s consent and support, he accepted the role. As the acting foreign minister explained to us, the group was to include Japan (representing Asia), the Vatican (representing Europe), Canada (representing the Americas), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (providing food, water and amenities to the hostages on a daily basis). The Japanese representative opted to be an observer given the large number of Japanese hostages, and the ICRC representative decided to continue to devote his efforts entirely to the care and feeding of the hostages. The Guarantors effectively were limited to Tony Vincent and the Archbishop of Ayacucho, Monsignor Juan Luis Cipriani (representing the Vatican), although the Japanese representative, Terusuke Terada (Japanese ambassador in Mexico) provided much wise counsel.

Left to Right: Tony Vincent, Monsignor Cipriani, Domingo Palermo, Michel Minnig and Terusuke Terada

The mandate of the Group of Guarantors, as initially stipulated by the Peruvian government, was to be present when the terrorists laid down their arms, released the hostages and left the residence for a safe haven. They were not to be present during negotiations. The Guarantors argued successfully, that they could guarantee the implementation of an agreement if they had not been party to the negotiations. The Peruvian government reluctantly agreed with this point of view, and the guarantors discovered at their first meeting between the government and terrorists that negotiations had not yet started, and that the terrorists were becoming nervous about the unwillingness of the government to discuss their demands.

In order to kick-start negotiations, the Guarantors began to introduce ideas and to stimulate discussion in order to clarify positions and build at least a small measure of confidence. The Guarantor’s role moved from passive observer to facilitator, and eventually to mediator. As part of that process, I got to lead a sub-group to visit the MRTA leadership incarcerated in high-altitude, maximum-security prisons – scary, but that is another story.

To digress slightly, at some point in their career, diplomats receive training in “negotiating skills”. I had completed such a course several years before, and dug out the course material and my notes to see whether there was any inspiration there. It was a depressing exercise since, in this instance, none of the criteria for a successful negotiation were present: There was, inter alia, no willingness on either side to negotiate, no flexibility in positions, no mutual confidence, and on the terrorist side no clear understanding of what they really wanted. At times, they demanded the release of all their comrades from jail, at others better health, food and visits privileges, at others just the release of their key leaders. The Guarantors attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince the terrorists that the release of their leadership was a non-starter, and they should lower their expectations.

I had talked with hostage rescue experts from a number of countries, including our own, and the consensus was that an armed assault on the Japanese residence would be extremely costly in human lives, since the building was large, with many rooms and hostages and captors were spread throughout the building. A major factor was that the MRTA regularly practiced their routine for responding to such an attack – which essentially meant killing as many of the hostages as possible before being overwhelmed. The view was that if the takeover could be accomplished in under 3 minutes, 50% of the hostages would become casualties, 50% of the remaining hostages would die within the next 3 minutes, and so on. If the operation lasted more than 12 minutes, it was likely that all the hostages would be dead or wounded.

Peruvian police coaxing the terrorists keeping watch

The Guarantors believed that the only conceivable favourable outcome was a negotiated exit strategy. All efforts were made to ensure such a conclusion, but as the months passed, very little progress was made. Meetings between the government and the terrorists were few and pro forma, accomplished little. In consequence, the Guarantors spent more of their time in the Japanese residence attempting to make the terrorists listen to reason and urging the hostages to keep calm and not provoke their captors. In this, the Guarantors were more successful. Moral remained relatively high among the hostages, there were few instances of confrontation between the hostages and terrorists, and a form a reverse Stockholm syndrome emerged - several of the young (15 to 16 years of age) and impressionable terrorists were awed by being the presence of ministers, generals and ambassadors and saw them as role models.

In the meantime, the Peruvian army was digging tunnels under the residence…

A Bloody Summer

This weekend, I am proud to share a very special blog entry with you all that my father, David Bickford, has generously contributed. These are his accounts of the Japanese Embassy hostage crisis. He was the Political Councillor at the Embassy of Canada in Lima, Peru from 1995 to 1999. Enjoy the read of A Bloody Summer (Part 1 of 5):

By December 1996, many of us believed that terrorist activity in Lima was on the wane. Attacks on police stations, bombings and car bombs were less frequent, and crime with violence appeared to be a more potent threat to our families’ security. Thus, terrorism was not at the front of my mind when I received a call in the evening of December 17 to inform me that Ambassador and Mrs Vincent were in some way victims of a terrorist occupation of the Japanese residence. Thus began the longest cocktail party in human history, or what one Peruvian newspaper later described as “The Bloody Summer.”

India and Israel's Ambassadors flanking the hosts

Not really knowing what was happening, as the number 2 at the Embassy, I called colleagues from the staff, and we sped to the Embassy to open up the office and a channel with Ottawa as well as to try to gather information on what had occurred at the Japanese residence. It soon became clear that Tony and Lucie Vincent were being held captive by an MRTA terrorist cell along with well over 600 other Peruvian and foreign dignitaries. At about midnight all of the women and some of the older guests were released, leaving perhaps 350 inside. At about 2:00 in the morning, I received a telephone call from a calm and collected Tony Vincent, to debrief me on what was happening in the residence. He had borrowed someone’s cell phone and we talked with the sound of snoring in the background. Tony informed me that, beyond himself, there were three other Canadians among the hostages. With four Canadian lives at risk, this became essentially a consular crisis for the Embassy – everything else was subordinated to the task of ensuring that these Canadians emerged unscathed. None of us slept that night.

The next afternoon Tony was released as part of a commission to present the terrorists’ demands to President Fujimori. I was near the front of the Japanese residence at that time, and it was a huge relief to see him emerge, tired and dishevelled but unharmed. For the next 24 hours, Tony made repeated attempts to meet with Fujimori, but his efforts had been rebuffed. At this point, Fujimori clearly wanted to devise and put a strategy in place before receiving any communiqué from the terrorists.

Minister Tudela surrounded by the MRTA

That evening Tony told me that he would be going back into the Japanese residence to inform the terrorists that he had not been successful in his task, but that he would continue his efforts. While the two of us got along well, this time we argued. I told him not to go back in – who knows whether he would be allowed to leave again. He persisted, and I told him to send in a written status report with the Red Cross. He refused, and I asked him why he was so insistent about going back in. “Because I gave my word” he replied[1]. Again, I argued that we were dealing with unpredictable terrorists, and one didn’t have to keep his word to such people. He again insisted, and while I didn’t agree with what he was doing, I appreciated his courage and desire to help ensure the safety of many of his colleagues and friends. I watched him go into the residence with a mixture of emotions: fear and apprehension that he wouldn’t be coming out alive; and pride that the Canadian foreign service had produced someone like him. I don’t think I took a full breath until he emerged some 30 minutes later.

Over the next few days, Tony was able to deliver the MRTA’s terms to the government’s “interlocutor” for negotiations with the terrorists, and all the other Canadian hostages had been released. With terms delivered and all Canadians now safe, I heaved a sigh of relief and thought that our direct involvement in the crisis was over. Little did I know…

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[1] For more on this, see David Goldfield’s book “The Ambassador’s Word”

The Japanese Embassy Hostage Crisis

The ambience of diplomatic cocktail parties is very glamorous. The guest list includes the usual suspects: high-ranking foreign dignitaries representing each and every international mission in the country, senior business executives from companies with stakes in the local market, and the who’s who of the domestic political and business elite. Everyone pulls out their best attire, including the military attaches looking very official with all their colourful medals. Every country is subtly recommended to send the senior most people possible from within their ranks as kindling fueling the flames of an amicable relationship. Brian and I both had the pleasure of suiting up for some of these fine occasions, which helped to refine our networking skills and proudly represent our youth to the highest possible standard. These fancy shin-dings are usually held to celebrate important events such as national days or in this case, the Emperor Akihito of Japan’s 63^rd birthday on December 17, 1996 at the official Japanese residence.

Japanese Ambassador Aoki and his wife Naoko greet Francisco Tudela

On that Tuesday evening, Brian and I were rocking out in the living room enjoying some quality mind-numbing American television programming – we had the major networks on Cable Magico transmitting from Denver, Colorado – while Maman was stuck correcting exams as her deadline for handing in her students’ end of semester marks approached. Dad’s mobility had been somewhat limited due to contracting a treacherous stomach flu, needing to remain at close proximity of his trustworthy white porcelain friend. No need to delve into further detail there. He was the number two in our Embassy and was scheduled to attend the function that evening however, due to his condition at the time, he honourably bowed out. Our Ambassador Anthony Vincent and his wife, Lucie, were the only fine members of our corps showing their friendly faces on behalf of our country. Aside from them, many of my friends from school’s parents were there as guests, sharing the memorable occasion as a sign of respect to the Japanese. The people from the land of the rising sun were also blessed with the presence of some of President Alberto Fujimori’s family (all very active in the political world), members of his cabinet and government. Now that’s what I call an A-list.

The lavish soiree was eventually halted by the wrong kind of bang. A most unwelcome and unexpected bang shifting to a rather molotovesque ambiance. An explosion on one of the rear walls of the residence announced the rapid entrance of 14 members of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (commonly referred to as MRTA), crashing the party with Nestor Cerpa Cartolini at the helm. As Tim “The Toolman” Tailor’s antics on Tool Time entertained Brian and I, Dad came running down the stairs dressed in his work attire, followed by Maman walking swiftly behind him to see him off. Ambassador Vincent’s driver, Segundo, had called him to let him know some inexplicable event had unfolded. My brother and I wondered what had occurred as there had not been enough time to tell us or to draw significant conclusions. Our mother rushed to us, asking us to turn to the local news channel. As the good sons we were, we complied only to witness live coverage from San Isidro – an upscale Lima neighbourhood – with no real tickers explaining developments as commonly observed on CNN showing all sorts of obscure live footage. Suddenly we saw military vehicles, a Peruvian version of the elite American SWAT team and other security forces taking over the streets amidst an air full of tear gas and shots rifled through the air. It seemed that even the media had no idea what was going on, except for an explosion having gone off. The locals were all very familiar with bombs and violence, but thought that the days of terrorism were long gone after defeating the Shining Path.

After hours of watching and no news update from Dad, the situation was crystal clear. This was a hostage crisis. My father was at the Embassy in Miraflores, organizing a crisis centre to keep in the loop and act as a channel for Ottawa. He brought in the RCMP attaché, security and consular staff with others on standby if need be. They were bracing for everything and anything. My first reaction was to thank God for my father’s stomach flu and my mother’s work. Otherwise, they would have been there without a doubt. Then my mind turned to the diversity of the school’s population and my friends. Actually, even those who I just knew existed. Damn! Maybe they had parents in there! What was going to happen to them? Would they ever see their parents again? Would the terrorists execute one of them to demonstrate to the Peruvian government that this was a serious outfit? Every scenario usually witnessed in a suspenseful Hollywood action movie seemed possible. Surely, this never would have happened in Canada.

Canadian Ambassador Anthony Vincent as he was released

As the clock struck 2:00 AM, the first hostages were released. These were primarily women and older guests. Among the women was none other than Alberto Fujimori’s mother who could have been a major bargaining chip. This was a significantly male-driven society, similarly to its South American neighbours, therefore it was impossible to conceive that any female hostage could be a potential strategic asset. Within twenty-four hours, our Ambassador Anthony Vincent was released along with Heribert Woeckell of Germany, Alcibiades Carokis of Greece (these last two fleeing Peru on the first available flight after their return to freedom) and Armando Lecaros, of the Peruvian Foreign Ministry at the time. The MRTA released them in the condition they would take their various demands to President Fujimori to begin a negotiation process. The Peruvians held strongly to their conviction of not negotiating with terrorists, and Vincent and Lecaros were continuously turned away by the closed door of the head of state’s office. It was hardly a time to breathe easy as 300 men were left and their lives were still in the balance. A good few weeks later, this number was reduced to 72 who would be in this for the long haul. Some of my buddies such as Kensuke Kobayashi and Jorge Gumucio were going to have to wait in suspense to find out if their fathers were ever going to return home safely.